

**A comparative analysis of global stakeholders' perceptions of the governance quality of the CDM and REDD+**

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**ABSTRACT**

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the nascent Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) are two global market-based mechanisms that link developed and developing countries. This paper provides a quantitative and qualitative analysis of global level stakeholders' perceptions regarding the governance of the CDM, focusing on environmental, social, economic, governmental and institutional participants. The research conducted was by means of an anonymous online survey, using a normative framework of principles, criteria and indicators (PC&I). It compares these findings with the results of a similar survey conducted by the authors on REDD+. Stakeholders from both the global North (developed countries) and the global South (developing countries) were asked to rate the quality of these mechanisms against 11 performance indicators, using a scale from 'very low' to 'very high' (1-5). Overall, the results of CDM stakeholders from both the global North and global South were very similar, indicating a common perception. The highest and lowest total scores were obtained from institutional and social stakeholders, respectively, demonstrating that these two groups have considerable differences in perceptions from other interests. CDM failed two indicators, "equality" and "resources", and passed all other nine indicators only marginally. The performance of REDD+ was much higher than CDM in all aspects of governance surveyed. The major differences were in "equality" and "problem solving"; followed by "transparency" and "democracy". If the CDM is to be continued in the post-Kyoto period, some major systemic changes in governance are necessary. Here, there are some lessons to be learnt from REDD+.

**Keywords:** CDM, REDD+, indicator, global survey, global south, global north

## INTRODUCTION

In recent years, 'multi-level governance' has been increasingly used as a term to replace the earlier 'regime' concept of international rulemaking, particularly influential in international relations (IR) theory (Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2004). This follows on from a body of work that has arisen in over the past decade and half, which argues for a broader understanding of state and non-state relations than those explained by traditional top-down, command-control models of state authority. Modern governance is portrayed as essentially social-political in nature, and consists of a series of 'co'-arrangements between state and non-state actors, more oriented towards collaborative approaches to problem solving (Kooiman 1993 2000). Contemporary environmental governance articulates this trend particularly strongly, and is exemplified by the interactions that occur between decentralised networks made up of multiple actors functioning at all levels (Haas 2002). Various initiatives, using trade as a basis for sustainable development, including forestry, have given rise to the term non-state market-driven (NSMD) governance. Such initiatives cover a wide range of commodity sectors, from fisheries through to agriculture, tourism, mining, and trade itself (Cadman 2011; Gulbrandsen 2005). There is a growing recognition that more research is needed to explore the dimensions of governance quality in these and other international environmental policy processes (Corbera and Schroeder 2011). A second, equally important, and related observation is that greater attention should be paid to evaluating the success of policies on the basis of the social processes, which drive decision-making (Barnett 2010).

Although there is a strong, economic rationale to use market-based or at least market-linked instruments in this policy field, experience with the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) show that carbon governance is a dynamic policy arena. Marketing mechanism addresses the problem of climate change via a range of state and non-state market-based mechanisms to encourage sustainable management of scarce resources, and thereby reduce greenhouse gas emissions. An important question for global marketing mechanisms (such as CDM and REDD+) is whether structural and procedural aspects will be given sufficient weight so that as meaningful participation of stakeholders as possible takes place (Lederer 2011). The success of such mechanisms as international mechanisms will further depend on the existence of governance arrangements that are also able to deliver both emission reductions at scale (i.e. solve the problem), as well as being transparent, and inclusive. Global decision-making

processes will need to include methods that engage representatives of a range of non-state interests, including forest dependent peoples, civil society organizations, and the private sector (Lyster 2011). Decision-making also needs to be equitable, and cater for a range of needs, both relating to communities most at risk from climate change, as well as broader concerned communities (Barnett 2010).

Despite the proliferation of such systems, there are no consistent rules to guide them and universal standards remain elusive (Whitman 2005, Bebhuk and Hamdani 2009). There are a number of institutions that accredit individual governance programmes, such as the International Standardisation Organisation (ISO), but there are no best practice governance standards across the sustainable development policy domain, against which competing programmes can be evaluated. Well-designed governance standards have the potential to build institutional capacity and verify performance. Poor governance on the other hand can increase costs and result in such negative outcomes as a reduction in credit rating (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006). Governance standards will help avoid some of the uncertainties that interested parties currently experience regarding the quality of a given system, and whether to lend it unwarranted legitimacy through their participation.

Using a hierarchical framework of principles, criteria and indicators (PC&I), a consistent framework for evaluating governance at the global, regional, national and local levels now exists (Cadman 2011). Using this approach, this paper provides a quantitative and qualitative analysis of global level stakeholders' perceptions regarding the governance of the CDM, focusing on environmental, social, economic, governmental and institutional participants. It compares these findings with the results of a similar survey conducted by the authors on the emerging 'carbon' market mechanism REDD+.

## **A BRIEF SNAPSHOT OF CDM**

The Kyoto Protocol set legally binding greenhouse gas reduction targets of at least 5.2% of 1990 levels by the first commitment period (2008-2012). To achieve this target in a cost-effective manner, the Protocol adopted three flexible market-based mechanisms: Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) with only the CDM linked back to developing countries. The main objective of the CDM is to help developed countries (and their approved organizations) to meet their quantified emission

reductions obligations at lower cost, while helping developing countries with technology transfer and in achieving sustainable development. Since the registration of the first CDM project in 2004, the number of registered CDM projects has increased exponentially: 62 in 2005, 409 in 2006, 426 in 2007, 431 in 2008, 684 in 2009, 809 in 2010, and 1107 in 2011 (UNFCCC, 2012). As of 27 November 2012, 5,133 CDM projects have been registered in 78 developing countries and these projects were anticipated to generate more than 2,700 million CERs by the end of 2012 (UNFCCC 2012).

Similarly, the CDM market value also grew exponentially until 2008: US\$2.6 billion in 2005, US\$6.2 billion in 2006, US\$12.8 billion in 2007 and US\$32.8 billion in 2008 (World Bank, 2008 & 2009; Point Carbon, 2008). The demand for CDM projects was largely driven by the CDM's eligibility to enter the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the world's largest carbon market), and on account of other voluntary and national carbon markets. Since 2008 the CDM market has been disestablished mainly due to global recession and as a consequence of the imminent end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (World Bank 2012). Over the past year alone carbon prices in the CDM market have declined by 70% and are projected to fall further due to decreasing demand and increasing supply (High-Level Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue 2012b). However, CDM has been beneficial in several fronts: (1) helped nations mitigate over one billion tons of greenhouse gas emissions; (2) realized US\$3.6 billion in savings for developed countries; (3) mobilized over US\$215 billion in investments in developing countries, thereby accelerating economic growth and poverty alleviation; and (4) developing countries gained valuable experience with innovative climate solutions (High Level Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue 2012a & b). Some developing countries even developed their own market (e.g., China) and climate change law (e.g, Mexico).

There is however, some considerable concentration of projects, from both the demand side (developed countries) and supply side (developing countries). Of the total registered projects, 50.86 percent are from China, 19.22 percent from India, 4.46 percent from Brazil, 3.02 percent from Mexico and 2.33 percent from Malaysia. That means approximately 75 percent of projects are in three of the four 'BRIC' (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries which are seen as emergent economies that will become major contributors to global growth in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Kedia et al. 2006). China, which is the 'super-BRIC' in terms scale and growth rate, is also the largest recipient in the CDM program. On the demand side, European countries

dominate, as might be expected given that the EU ETS has the strongest state regulatory support of any trading schemes to date. Over 80 percent of CDM markets investors are from the United Kingdom (39 percent), Switzerland (10.9 percent), Japan (9.6 percent), Netherlands (9.1 percent), Sweden (6.5 percent) and Germany (3.6 percent) (UNFCCC 2012).

There are several issues of CDM: the eligibility of HFC and N<sub>2</sub>O related projects have undermined the sustainable development objective; the provision of the unilateral CDM project activity has benefitted the resource-advantaged countries rather than the intended least developed countries, and reduced the chance of technology transfer; the rate of GHG emissions from China and India, which have higher number of CDM projects and have been issued higher number of CERs has been growing faster than the highest emitting Annex I countries; and there is huge regional disparity both in terms of CDM number of investments, failing to contribute to sustainability in target countries (for detail see Sterk and Wittneben 2006 p. 285; Teravainen 2009 p.180; Maraseni, in press). These and other problems have led key stakeholders within CDM itself to raise the alarm that the mechanism is ‘imperilled’ raising questions about future viability. Some may not mourn its demise; its collapse however would undermine what political consensus there is for global carbon markets (CDM Policy Dialogue 2012: 2).

### **A BRIEF SNAPSHOT OF REDD+**

The net annual change in forest area in the period 2000–2010 is estimated at –5.2 M ha (FAO 2011). Deforestation and forest degradation account for about 20% of global GHG emissions, more than the entire global transportation sector and second only to the energy sector (UN REDD Programme 2010). It is therefore widely recognised that without combating deforestation and forest degradation, the 2°C (or 450 ppm of CO<sub>2</sub>) climate stabilization goal will not be reached (Angelsen et al. 2009). Although the CDM also recognizes the role of forests in mitigating climate change, it initially limited its scope to afforestation and reforestation activities and its ability to achieve intended outcomes was questioned. The transition in UNFCCC negotiations via the Bali Action Plan (2007) to the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation by means of REDD+ in COP15 may reflect this reality.

REDD+ aims to address deforestation and forest degradation by delivering performance-based payments to forest managers in developing countries for the conservation and/or increase of forest carbon stocks (Parker et al 2009). REDD+ includes carbon accounting from the following activities: reducing emissions from deforestation; reducing emissions from forest degradation; conservation of forest carbon stocks; sustainable management of forest; and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (these may be afforestation, reforestation and restoration activities on deforested and degraded lands) (Bleaney et al. 2009). With the recognition of REDD+, developed countries may offset their GHG emissions through payments to developing countries that wish to participate in REDD+.

REDD+ has played a significant role in the transformation of North/South politics. Moreover, a number of agreements have been reached regarding REDD+, even if these are not legally binding (Lesniewska 2010: 105). Developing countries stand to gain considerably from REDD+ financially, as forestry will be a major component of funding of \$100 billion referred to in the Copenhagen Accord (Lesniewska 2010: 107). The mechanism gained further recognition at COP 16 in Cancun with Parties committing to develop a framework for negotiations for a global level REDD+ agreement (CIFOR 2011). A 'green climate fund' was established, and the onus was placed on developed countries to provide \$30 billion of climate finance to developing countries by 2012 (WRI 2010: p5). The importance of social and environmental safeguards was also highlighted in COP17 in Durban leading to the development of policy and procedure documents aimed at protecting safeguards (FCPF 2011; UN REDD 2012).

## **APPROACH AND METHOD OF EVALUATING THE QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE**

Global governance is assessed through the development of an analytical framework linking participation and deliberation to two central organising arrangements within global environmental governance: structure and process. Structure refers to which actors are viewed as valid participants. Process requirements focus on the governance arrangements used to reach decisions and implement them. Two principles have been created to emphasise the normative values underpinning participation and deliberation: participation is *meaningful* (i.e. that the involvement of participants is not tokenistic, but genuine); deliberation is expected to be *productive* (i.e. that negotiations actually generate 'products' that can be put into practice).

Based on the division between participation as structure and deliberation as process, the intent of the principles is elaborated by the use of criteria and indicators to determine the extent to which a specific institution, or associated programme, policy initiative, market mechanism, or project (or other form of sub-institutional arrangement) matches up to these desired values (Cadman 2011: 4-18). Principles and criteria are not created for measurement, but are represent desired elements in the determination of the extent of compliance. They are therefore associated with *indicators*, which represent quantitative or qualitative parameters, and describe the state of the governance system as they relate to the relevant criterion, and principle. The placement of these elements within this kind of framework frame-work is explicitly hierarchical, i.e. located consistently, to enable an evaluation of indicators to criteria, and criteria to principles. Consistency refers to the correct placement in the framework. Consistency in placement avoids overlap or duplication and ensures the correct linkage to higher-order attributes (Lammerts van Bueren and Blom 1997: 5-34). This use of principles, criteria and indicators facilitates the evaluation of institutional performance, and overall legitimacy (Cadman 2011: 44-45).

**Table 1 Hierarchical framework for the assessment of governance quality**

<u>Principle</u>	<i>Criterion</i>	Indicator
“ <u>Meaningful participation</u> ”	<i>Interest representation</i>	Inclusiveness
		Equality
		Resources
	<i>Organisational responsibility</i>	Accountability
		Transparency
“ <u>Productive deliberation</u> ”	<i>Decision-making</i>	Democracy
		Agreement
		Dispute settlement
	<i>Implementation</i>	Behavioural change
		Problem solving
		Durability

Source: Cadman 2011

Using these principles, criterion and indicators, this paper analyses stakeholders’ perceptions regarding the governance of the CDM and REDD+ at the global level, focusing on environmental, social, economic, and governmental participants and the institution itself. A

wide range of individual and organizational representatives involved with CDM and REDD+ were surveyed (in March 2010 for REDD+ stakeholders and November 2010 for CDM stakeholders) using Survey Monkey (surveymonkey.com). On the basis of their own perspectives, participants were asked to rate their perceptions of governance using the 11 indicators of Table 1 above, by means of a scale from ‘very low’ to ‘very high’ (1-5). The scores of the relevant indicators were added to determine performance at the criterion level. In turn, the relevant criteria were added to determine performance at the principle level; finally, the two principle scores were combined to determine overall performance. The final score is out of a total of 55. Survey respondents were also encouraged to offer comments in relation to each indicator. Qualitative comments from respondents in the CDM survey are also included below.

An Internet link to a pre-designed anonymous questionnaire was sent to 800 CDM stakeholders from around the world and 800 stakeholders from REDD+. Email addresses of the contact persons for the stakeholders were collected from publicly available participants’ lists from training workshops and information sessions advertised online, as well as websites. A total of 72 CDM stakeholders commenced the survey but only 45 (22 from Environment, six from the Social, four from Economic, one from the Government, four from Institutional and eight from other sectors) completed the survey. Similarly, 164 REDD+ stakeholders commenced the survey but only 44 completed the survey. There are many reasons (as reported by follow-up emails) why survey response and attempts rates are so much higher than the completion rate: (1) online surveys have generally lower participation rates than other forms of survey technique (Van Selm & Jankowski 2006: 447); (2) it could take up to one hour to answer all the questions, if qualitative comments were included; (3) analysis only considered the respondents who completed all survey questions; and (4) in many developing countries the internet is poor due to load shedding and interruptions in power supply.

Survey respondents were asked to classify themselves under six categories (“environmental”, “social”, “economic”, “governmental”, “secretariat or other institutional component”, and “other”), and to identify which region they came from (“global North”, or “global South”). In the case of CDM, these sectors are examined individually and the results are further broken down by geo-political region (North/South). With the focus on CDM, this paper simply groups REDD+ respondents according to their regional designation. More detailed results in relation to REDD+ are available elsewhere (Cadman and Maraseni 2012a, 2012b, 2011).



Finally, total scores for each principle, criterion and indicator in the CDM survey are compared to the REDD+ survey results.

It was not possible to test whether there was any statistically significant difference between the means (averages) of these different types of stakeholders for three reasons: (1) the sample size of each subset was too small (lower than a minimum requirement of 30 in all cases); (2) given the very low response rate it was unclear to what degree the samples are representative of the whole survey populations; and (3) the respondents self-selected themselves as belonging to different sectors (environmental, social, economic, governmental and institutional), meaning they were not sufficiently homogenous in nature for such analysis across surveys. Nevertheless, some interesting results were generated, and these are discussed below. However, the point should be made that it is not known at this stage if the mix of respondents is broad enough for the authors to be satisfied that they have done a sufficient job of covering the spectrum that is within the population. The approach is a novel one, and both the methods and analysis should therefore be seen as a work in process, requiring further research to determine if the trends identified are correct across the two ‘universes’ of CDM and REDD+.

A number of further observations also need to be made at this point regarding the results presented below. Respondents rated the mechanisms at the indicator level. A question has arisen in similar studies of global governance as to whether qualitative data – the method used here – can be applied to develop quantitative results. The conversion of verbal descriptions (low, medium, high) into numerical results can lead to judgments hidden underneath the apparent authority of a number, and the pretension of exact science (Nanz and Steffek 2005: 373). The authors accept that such results are indicative, rather than authoritative. In this study, there has also been an aggregation of scores at the indicator level to produce results at both the criterion and principle levels, and the overall score. In some instances, this has resulted in a situation where the mechanisms performed poorly in one indicator but met the threshold at the criterion level, or did not meet the criterion-level threshold, while still meeting requirements at a principle level. These factors should be taken into account when determining the results for each survey. It must also be stated that the numbers of respondents are low. This may have resulted in the ‘outlier’ effect, where very low numbers of respondents in one group can overly influence the results (particularly here in the cases in of government).

## **RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS**

### **CDM**

Scores for each sector are given in Table 2 (North) and Table 3 (South). Table 4 provides average scores across sectors and regions. Table 5 provides the comparative scores for CDM and REDD+ respondents, by region, and overall result. The tables are self-explanatory, but a few brief highlights are provided below.

Scores from both the global North and global South for CDM respondents follow the same trend, showing strong consistency in their perceptions. Institutional (secretariat) respondents, north and south, provided the highest total scores (40.5/55 cf 41/55) whereas social respondents provided the lowest total scores (19.5/55 cf vs 18/55). Both the northern and southern social respondents provided the lowest scores for all indicators: none of the 11 indicators have scored >2.5; the scores from institutional respondents for all the 11 indicators were >3.0. On the basis of the perspectives of social respondents the CDM fails both principles (meaningful participation was rated 8.5/25 and productive deliberation 10.5/30). The same goes for the criteria and indicators, whereas institutional respondents scores resulted in a 'pass' in all principles, criteria and indicators (see Table 2, 3 and 4). Clearly there is a difference in perceptions regarding the governance quality of CDM between these two groups.

Overall, the results of CDM stakeholders from both the global North and global South were very similar (29.1/55 cf. 29.8/55), indicating a common perception. Moreover, the overall average of all stakeholders shows that CDM has marginally passed both principles (meaningful participation was rated 13/25 and productive deliberation 16.3/30) and all four criteria. In terms of the indicators, the highest average score was given for inclusiveness (3/5) and lowest for equality (2.3/5). All indicators, except equality and resources (2.4/5), were marginally more than 2.5 and equal to or less than 3, and therefore also 'passed' the quality of governance test (Table 4). Equality (i.e. the balance of power relations between stakeholders), and resources (i.e. the provision of technical, informational, financial or institutional capacity) are clearly important areas for further investigation in CDM governance.

In terms of qualitative comments, for one, since “the CDM mechanism itself” was “flawed”, they did “not expect improvement of CDM and associated projects”. Several made comments regarding what sort of projects they thought should be included within the mechanism’s ambit. These included a focus only on renewable energy, or energy projects, which supplied the poor. The rules should also be tightened to avoid the problem of additionality, and there should be a “much more thorough and realistic definition of sustainable development...centred around tangible deliverables”. One NGO argued that improving the CDM “cannot be done”, since it was “not designed to be inclusive and cannot work if it is”. Views regarding equality reflected these sentiments as well. One respondent suggested that there should be a positive bias towards poor countries and “household” level projects. According to others, a major problem with the current system was the predominance of economic interests on the CDM’s decision-making Executive Board (EB); this would only be solved by “removing decision makers with either financial or vested interests from the EB”. The rules need to be tightened, because their “relaxed definitional basis and methodology” meant that the CDM and its related projects had “evolved and been constructed in such a way that [they favoured] the might of capital rather than the other less ‘powerful’ interests”. Views regarding democracy were nuanced. One respondent suggested that the CDM was “at best ... an exercise in low-intensity democracy; if not a bold attempt to architect a 21st century oligonomy--i.e. [or] an oligopoly ... creating an economic endeavour with a very small universe of the same buyers and sellers”. In a “macro” sense it was democratic “in as much as most, if not all participants, are consulted and voluntarily opt for participation”. But it was most certainly not democratic at the local level:

Because the project investment isn't benefiting the people it needs and arguably should be. The CDM makes a lot of money and reaffirms the power of those who already have both, and in general do little to improve the socio-environmental conditions of those who stand at the periphery of the arenas of political and economic power.

The economic orientation and design of the CDM also affected nature of the agreements made, which were “hindered by the underlying definitional basis of the market itself”. The ability of the CDM to settle disputes fairly was roundly condemned by one respondent: “having attended CDM EBs, we can say that disputes are resolved behind closed doors, outside light of day. The process is nothing short of a vulgar display of corruption in action”.

Although inclusiveness rated highly, written responses were mixed; some considered the CDM to be socially inclusive, while others questioned its rigour. One respondent felt that it followed the rules “especially through frequent consultations, not only with regards to the CDM project but also via [independent forest management certification programme] FSC [Forest Stewardship Council]”. Other respondents disagreed arguing that: “there should be more inspection by the government to certify the fact that the CDM project activity directly involves the local community”. CDM projects used people solely as a means to maintain the “existence of such initiatives; however, in reality the benefits for the people in the long run are minimal (when considering the amounts traded)”.

Equality rated lowest and also the written comments were largely negative. Echoing NGOs, one respondent expressed the view that: “The interests of investors have priorities. The interests of foreign investors have priority over the interests of local partners. The interests of communities are at the end of the queue”. Democracy rated 2.7 out of 5, one respondent qualified this perspective by noting that: “In the negotiations, with the (theoretical) principle of one country one vote, there is more democracy. In the projects, it does not exist.” Written comments concerning the reaching of agreements in CDM were again divided between positive and negative opinion. One respondent was of the view that the mechanisms in place to were “the most rigid and conservative worldwide”, but they could also see “room for improvement”. Another was of the view that it was not sufficient for the CDM to make agreements largely in relation only to offsets; they wanted greater effort in addressing “environmental quality in the area where the CDM was being implemented”.

Regarding dispute settlement only two comments were offered. The positive response pointed to the existence of “many CDM projects in the world” as evidence that the mechanism was conflict free. A second opinion was less positive: “In theory it’s better than in practice. The communities end up becoming hostages of the project developers and implementing companies, and have extreme difficulty in bringing lawsuits”.

The one Southern governmental respondent provided a high score for the CDM. They did not provide many comments. They linked the issue of “additionality” to equality (i.e. the problem that CDM projects could compensate pre-existing projects that did not create additional, genuine, reductions in emissions), and they wanted clear definitions. As far as the need for resources, or capacity building was concerned, they wanted to see more devolution of

authority to DNAs and capacity building for them at the national level, as well as an extension of the DoEs into regional areas. Here, there was a linkage to accountability, with a suggestion that the CDM required systems for “monitoring at various tiers with local, regional and central” authorities and such tools as “check lists” to ensure compliance. In terms of democracy, they were also the view that “communities are largely unaware, and not involved during the process.”

### **REDD+**

As noted above, the discussion here focuses only on Northern and Southern perceptions, for comparison with the CDM. In the case of Northern respondents, REDD+ passed both principles (meaningful participation was rated 16.2 out of 25 and productive deliberation 21 out of 30), as well as all the criteria, and indicators (Table 5). The views of Southern respondents were also similar. The total overall score for Northern respondents was slightly higher than that of the score of global south stakeholders (37.2/55 cf. 36.4/55). The highest average scores were given for two indicators, transparency and democracy (both scored 3.4/5) and the lowest average score was given for resources (2.4/5).

In terms of the ability to which Northern, governmental interests could get their views represented, a comment was made that “a lot depends on the negotiator and the chair”. In terms of inclusiveness, they rated their perceptions lower than their Southern counterparts. For equality, the results are reversed. However, one respondent felt that the various Parties were treated “maybe too equally”. They added that “Some countries have more interest/at stake than others in REDD+”, so they were “not so sure anymore that the one country, one vote system is adequate for REDD”.

According to one respondent, getting their interests “on the table” was difficult, with another making the point REDD+ was especially difficult to follow and influence “when you’re not a government representative”. In terms of the inclusion of specific needs, another respondent felt that matters of environmental and social governance were not being “adequately addressed” in REDD+. This same respondent saw that the failure to address important issues also meant that specific interests such as forest communities were not being treated equally.

Southern stakeholders responses were more numerous, and diverse in their perspectives than their Northern counterparts, and governments. Respondents from South East Asia and Africa were generally positive: one respondent from Latin America did not believe civil society could influence the process. One of the more detailed responses pointed out that “given that only parties can actually participate, and they look out for their national interests” there were nevertheless “various forums which spill into the UNFCCC-REDD+ process” even if the “official ‘process’ itself does not allow much for this”. In terms of inclusiveness, Southern NGOs rated higher than Northern stakeholders. One respondent made that point that with regards to the extent that issues important to NGOs were heard, the degree of inclusion was medium to high; but in terms of the extent to which they were heeded, the answer was low. For another: “few countries [led] the political process of the negotiations”. To be inclusive, one respondent added that it was important to include marginalised groups in society, including women. In terms of equality, one respondent challenged the notion that non-governmental interests should be treated equally. For them “the process is driven by the COP, and is set up to vet the views of Parties and to provide a forum for them to reach agreement on a post-2012 climate change regime”. Another felt that REDD+ tried to treat everyone equally “but [it] is very hard to please everyone”. Views regarding democracy, as with other indicators, were along regional lines. One respondent from Latin America felt that “large countries include provisions that do not favour the environment, but economic interests”; by contrast another felt that the REDD+ was democratic, “but the process by consensus is very inefficient and time consuming”. Views regarding the making of agreements were generally positive, although one respondent made an interesting observation that “enterprise interests of the ‘West’ almost always triumph”, although this was “mitigated with ‘Noise’ from the developing world”. Perceptions regarding dispute settlement are on a par with other NGOs and governments.

## **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Overall, the performance of REDD+ was much higher than the CDM in all indicators, and this is reflected in all criteria and principles (Table 5). The total score for CDM respondents is 29.4 (out of 55) in contrast to 36.8 for REDD+ stakeholders. Major differences were in “equality” (2.3 vs. 3.4) and “problem solving” (2.6 vs. 3.7), followed by “transparency” and “democracy” (both, 2.7 vs. 3.4). At the indicator level, however, there is one similarity: resources, which in both mechanisms scored 2.4 out of 5 and therefore merits a ‘fail’.

This may show an underlying problem in global environmental governance, especially in the context of intergovernmental policy development and implementation, where state actors have greater access to resources, than their non-state colleagues, who must often generate the necessary capital themselves, if they want to have a presence in negotiations. The universal low rating for resources in both CDM and REDD+ may reflect the reality that few stakeholders have the wherewithal to participate in global governance. While the participatory rhetoric at the global level has increased since Rio, and over the last 20 years, it is not always matched by reality. Given the mix of actors in contemporary global environmental governance, the methods of participation and deliberation associated with negotiations are as important as the decisions made about a given issue. In view of the stakeholder-based model of contemporary governance, there are increased expectations about the role of non-state actors, and this has created some dynamic tensions in the relations between non-state and state actors in the formulation of policy at the international level and its implementation at the national and sub-national levels. If the CDM is to be continued in the post-Kyoto period, it would be wise to spend more time on seeking to improve the governance arrangements stakeholder participation in CDM-related policy deliberations and project implementation. Rather than concentrating exclusively on the economic and technical aspects of crediting emissions reduction, it would be wise to learn from REDD+ – especially in the criteria where there is such a discrepancy between the two. However, more research across a larger number of participants in both these mechanisms is required to determine if these results are indicative of broader perceptions. But in view of the constant changes of personnel within global ‘policy populations’, finding a stable cohort of respondents will continue to be a challenge to analysis.

**Table 2 Respondents' perceptions of the governance quality of CDM (Global North, all sectors)**

Principle	1. Meaningful Participation Maximum score: 25; Minimum: 5							2. Productive deliberation Maximum score: 30 Minimum: 6							Total (out of 55)			
Criterion	1. Interest representation Maximum score: 15 Minimum: 3			2. Organisational responsibility Maximum score: 10 Minimum: 2				Principle Score	3. Decision-making Maximum score: 15 Minimum: 3				4. Implementation Maximum score: 15 Minimum: 3			Principle Score		
Indicator	Inclus- iveness	Equal- ity	Resour- ces	Criterion Score	Account- ability	Trans- parency	Criterion Score		Democ- racy	Agree- ment	Dispute settle- ment	Criterion Score	Behav- ioural change	Prob- lem solving			Dura- bility	Criterion Score
Env (2)	2.3	1.9	1.9	6.1	2.1	2.4	4.5	10.6	2.2	2.1	2.3	6.5	2.0	1.9	2.2	6.1	12.6	23.2
Soc (2)	1.5	1	1.5	4	2	2.5	4.5	8.5	2	2.5	2	6.5	1.5	1	2	4.5	11.0	19.5
Eco (3)	3.7	2.7	2.7	9.0	3.3	3.3	6.7	15.7	3.0	3.3	3.0	9.3	4.0	3.7	3.3	11	20.3	36.0
Govt (0)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Sec (2)	4.5	3.5	4.5	12.5	4	3.5	7.5	20.0	3	4	3	10.0	4	3	3.5	10.5	20.5	40.5
Other (4)	2.8	1.8	1.8	6.3	2.8	2.3	5.0	11.3	2.3	2.5	2.5	7.3	2.5	2.3	3.3	8	15.3	26.5
Avg	3.0	2.2	2.5	7.6	2.8	2.8	5.6	13.2	2.5	2.9	2.6	7.9	2.8	2.4	2.9	8.0	15.9	29.1

Note: Env, Soc, Eco, Govt, Sec are abbreviated forms for Environmental, Social, Economic, Government and Secretariat (institutional) stakeholders, respectively. For the estimation of overall average, each group of stakeholders have been equally weighted (Source: Online survey, November 2010)



Table 3 Respondents' perceptions of the governance quality of CDM (Global South, all sectors)

Principle	1. Meaningful Participation Maximum score: 25; Minimum: 5							2. Productive deliberation Maximum score: 30 Minimum: 6							Total (out of 55)			
Criterion	1. Interest representation Maximum score: 15 Minimum: 3			2. Organisational responsibility Maximum score: 10 Minimum: 2				Principle Score	3. Decision-making Maximum score: 15 Minimum: 3				4. Implementation Maximum score: 15 Minimum: 3			Principle Score		
Indicator	Inclusiveness	Equality	Resources	Criterion Score	Accountability	Transparency	Criterion Score		Democracy	Agreement	Dispute settlement	Criterion Score	Behavioural change	Problem solving			Durability	Criterion Score
Env (10)	2.9	2.3	2.0	7.2	2.3	2.7	5.0	12.2	2.2	2.6	2.1	6.9	2.9	2.5	3.1	8.5	15.4	27.6
Soc (4)	1.5	1.5	1.5	4.5	2.0	2.0	4.0	8.5	1.8	1.5	1.3	4.5	1.8	1.5	1.8	3.3	9.5	18
Eco (1)	3	2	1	6.0	2	3	5.0	11.0	3	3	3	9.0	3	3	2	8.0	17.0	28.0
Govt (1)	3	3	3	9.0	3	3	6.0	15.0	3	3	3	9.0	3	3	3	9.0	18.0	33.0
Secr (2)	5	3.5	4.5	13.0	3	2.5	5.5	18.5	4	4.5	3	11.5	4	4	3	11.0	22.5	41.0
Other (4)	3	2.5	2.25	7.8	3	2.5	5.5	13.3	3.25	3	3.25	9.5	2.5	3	2.75	8.3	17.8	31.0
Average	3.1	2.5	2.4	7.9	2.6	2.6	5.2	13.1	2.9	2.9	2.6	8.4	2.9	2.8	2.6	8.0	16.7	29.8

Note: Env, Soc, Eco, Govt, Sec are abbreviated forms for Environmental, Social, Economic, Government and Secretariat (institutional) stakeholders, respectively. For the estimation of overall average, each group of stakeholders have been equally weighted (Source: Online survey, November 2010)

Table 4 Respondents' perceptions of the governance quality of CDM (average of Global North and South)

Principle	1. Meaningful Participation Maximum score: 25; Minimum: 5							2. Productive deliberation Maximum score: 30 Minimum: 6							Total (out of 55)			
Criterion	1. Interest representation Maximum score: 15 Minimum: 3			Principle Score	2. Organisational responsibility Maximum score: 10 Minimum: 2			3. Decision-making Maximum score: 15 Minimum: 3			4. Implementation Maximum score: 15 Minimum: 3					Principle score		
Indicator	Inclus- iveness	Equal- ity	Resour- ces		Criterion Score	Account- ability	Trans- parency	Criterion Score	Democ- racy	Agree- ment	Dispute settle- ment	Criterion Score	Behav- ioural change	Prob- lem solving			Dura- bility	Criterion Score
Env (12/10)	2.6	2.1	2.0	6.7	2.2	2.6	4.8	11.4	2.2	2.4	2.2	6.7	2.5	2.2	2.7	7.3	14.0	25.4
Soc (2/4)	1.5	1.3	1.5	4.3	2.0	2.3	4.3	8.5	1.9	2.0	1.7	5.5	1.7	1.3	1.9	3.9	10.3	18.8
Eco (3/1)	3.4	2.4	1.9	7.5	2.7	3.2	5.9	13.4	3.0	3.2	3.0	9.2	3.5	3.4	2.7	9.5	18.7	32.0
Govt (0/1)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Secr (2/2)	4.8	3.5	4.5	12.8	3.5	3.0	6.5	19.3	3.5	4.3	3.0	10.8	4.0	3.5	3.3	10.8	21.5	40.8
Other (4/4)	2.9	2.2	2.0	7.1	2.9	2.4	5.3	12.3	2.8	2.8	2.9	8.4	2.5	2.7	3.0	8.2	16.6	28.8
Overall average	3.0	2.3	2.4	7.7	2.7	2.7	5.4	13.0	2.7	2.9	2.6	8.1	2.8	2.6	2.8	8.0	16.3	29.4

Note: Env, Soc, Eco, Govt, Sec are abbreviated forms for Environmental, Social, Economic, Government and Secretariat (institutional) stakeholders, respectively. For the estimation of overall average, each group of stakeholders have been equally weighted (Source: Online survey, November 2010)

Table 5 Comparison of respondents' perceptions of the governance quality of CDM and REDD+

Principle	1. Meaningful Participation Maximum score: 25; Minimum: 5							2. Productive deliberation Maximum score: 30 Minimum: 6							Principle score	Total (out of 55)		
Criterion	1. Interest representation Maximum score: 15 Minimum: 3			2. Organisational responsibility Maximum score: 10 Minimum: 2				Principle Score	3. Decision-making Maximum score: 15 Minimum: 3				4. Implementation Maximum score: 15 Minimum: 3					
Indicator	Inclusiveness	Equality	Resources	Criterion Score	Accountability	Transparency	Criterion Score		Democracy	Agreement	Dispute settlement	Criterion Score	Behavioural change	Problem solving			Durability	Criterion Score
Global N CDM (23)	3.0	2.2	2.5	7.6	2.8	2.8	5.6	13.2	2.5	2.9	2.6	7.9	2.8	2.4	2.9	8.0	15.9	29.1
Global N REDD+ (11)	3.3	3.5	2.5	9.9	3.0	3.4	6.4	16.2	3.4	3.5	3.2	9.9	3.7	3.8	3.6	11.1	21.0	37.2
Global S CDM (22)	3.1	2.5	2.4	7.9	2.6	2.6	5.2	13.1	2.9	2.9	2.6	8.4	2.9	2.8	2.6	8.0	16.7	29.8
Global S REDD+ (31)	3.8	3.4	2.4	9.5	3.3	3.5	6.7	16.2	3.4	3.3	3.1	9.7	3.6	3.6	3.5	10.5	20.2	36.4
Global avg CDM (45)	3.0	2.3	2.4	7.7	2.7	2.7	5.4	13.0	2.7	2.9	2.6	8.1	2.8	2.6	2.8	8.0	16.3	29.4
Global avg REDD+ (44)	3.5	3.4	2.4	9.7	3.1	3.4	6.5	16.2	3.4	3.4	3.1	9.8	3.6	3.7	3.5	10.8	20.6	36.8

Note: For the estimation of global average, each group of stakeholders have been equally weighted (Source: Online survey, November 2010 for CDM and March 2010 for REDD+ data)

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